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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4566 
___________ 
 
STEPHEN WEIL, 
                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DR. DAVID L. WHITE; WALT EISENHAUER; ANNA MAE SMITH; 
JOHN LEFFERT; DR. MICHAEL GREENBERG; DR. DEBORAH ERICKSON; 
LANE BOWER; MARY ROSE-COLLEY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-12-cv-00413) 
District Judge:  Matthew W. Brann  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 17, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Stephen Weil appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on his First 
Amendment retaliation claims.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
will affirm. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only those facts that are 
necessary to our disposition.  Weil was a student in the Physician Assistant (“PA”) 
program at Lock Haven University (“LHU”).  To graduate, Weil was required to 
successfully complete a preceptorship—a period of clinical training in a physician-
supervised practice.  Weil was assigned to complete his preceptorship at Clinton Medical 
Associates (“CMA”), a privately owned medical practice.  Weil’s preceptor was Dr. 
Michael Greenberg.  Dr. Greenberg is the president and CEO of CMA, as well as the 
Medical Director for LHU’s PA program.  
 During the first week of Weil’s preceptorship, Weil met with defendant Leffert, a 
faculty member at LHU, to discuss his experience at the preceptorship.  At this meeting, 
Weil said he had some “general ethical concerns” about his rotation at CMA.  Weil did 
not elaborate, but later alleged that he was referring to instances where CMA employees 
created billing entries that he thought were designed to mislead insurers.  Mid-way 
through Weil’s second week at CMA, Nadine McGraw, a Physician Assistant at CMA, 
emailed LHU faculty members stating that Weil would no longer be permitted to see 
patients at CMA because she had concerns about his behavior and competence.  McGraw 
stated that Weil had been rude to her; “diagnosed” patients without his preceptor’s 
approval, causing unnecessary stress and alarm; frequently came in late, left early, and 
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requested time off; and was unwilling to work and had a poor attitude.  Several days later, 
Weil was dismissed from CMA.   
 Three weeks later, Weil met with the majority of the PA Program faculty.  The 
faculty presented Weil with a behavioral contract, which was prepared by the faculty, 
specified his unprofessional behavior during his rotation at CMA, stated that he would 
receive a grade of “E” for the preceptorship-practicum course, and set forth multiple 
conditions for his continuation in the PA program.  Weil refused to sign the contract.  
Instead, two months later, Weil filed an application for graduation, which was denied, in 
part, because he had not passed the preceptorship-practicum course.   
 Weil later appealed his grade of “E” for the practicum course.  Weil’s grade-
appeal was denied by a faculty member, and then by the Department Chair.  Weil then 
appealed to the interim Dean for the College of Education and Human Services, alleging 
that he witnessed three instances where Dr. Greenberg and/or McGraw created billing 
entries designed to mislead insurers, and that he was dismissed from CMA several days 
after he reported his ethical concerns to Leffert.  The interim Dean denied Weil’s grade 
appeal.   
 Weil then appealed his grade to the Provost and Vice-President of Academic 
Affairs, who granted his appeal and changed his grade from an “E” to an “Incomplete” on 
a temporary basis.  Weil was informed that he could re-enroll in the PA program without 
paying tuition for the semester.  He was told, however, that before he could begin the 
preceptorship and graduate, he would-be required to complete a comprehensive written 
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examination and a practical physical examination.  Weil failed the practical examination.  
He was offered a chance to re-take it and was warned that if he failed a second time, he 
would be dismissed from the program.  Weil failed the re-examination and was dismissed 
from the PA Program.  Weil unsuccessfully appealed his dismissal to the Provost.   
 Weil then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1  He named as defendants Dr. 
Greenberg and several members of the LHU faculty.  Weil claimed that the defendants 
violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speaking out about the 
fraudulent billing practices he observed at CMA.  Weil alleged that these defendants 
engaged in fourteen separate acts of retaliation, including: “denying him the minimum 
due process required for conduct code violations”; allowing Dr. Greenberg’s employees 
to investigate Weil’s allegations of billing fraud; preparing a behavior contract; asking 
Weil to sign it; dismissing him from the CMA preceptorship; providing him with 
erroneous information regarding his grade appeal; ignoring his requests for his education 
records; subjecting him to atypical testing requirements; determining that he failed the 
practical examination; using the same proctor to administer his second practical 
examination, in apparent violation of the student handbook; failing to provide immediate 
feedback for his practical examinations; providing him with “misleading information” 
regarding his performance on the practical examinations; dismissing him after he failed 
                                              
1 His complaint also stated claims under §§ 1985 and 1986.  Weil voluntarily withdrew 
those claims. 
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both practical examinations without allowing him to take a third practical examination; 
and by “conspiring together to prevent the release of damaging information about LHU.”   
 The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted.  
The District Court concluded that neither CMA2 nor Dr. Greenberg were state actors with 
regard to any action involving Weil’s dismissal from CMA.  The District Court also 
found that providing Weil with erroneous information regarding his appeal was not an 
adverse action sufficient to support a retaliation claim under the First Amendment.  In 
addition, the District Court concluded that the record did not support Weil’s contention 
that there was a causal connection between defendants’ actions and his speech.3     
 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard a 
district court would apply.  Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559 (3d Cir. 2015).  We 
draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  Montone v. City of 
Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).  Summary judgment 
should be granted when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
To make out a retaliation claim, Weil was required to point to evidence showing 
that: (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he was subjected to adverse actions by a 
state actor, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected First Amendment 
                                              
2 Weil did not name CMA as a defendant.   
3 The District Court also determined that because Weil was not punished for a 
disciplinary violation, he was not entitled to the due process protections set forth in the 
regulations of the Pennsylvania State System of Education for Student Disciplinary Due 
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speech and the retaliation.  Lauren W. v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Even if these elements were met, the defendants, we note, could defeat Weil’s claims of 
retaliation “by showing that [they] would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff 
had not engaged in the protected activity.”  Id.  The District Court rejected all of Weil’s 
claims in a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, with which we substantially agree.  
We offer the following amplification about a few of Weil’s claims.   
I.  Weil’s Dismissal from CMA 
Dr. Greenberg was entitled to summary judgment on this claim because there is no 
evidence that he knew of Weil’s speech before Weil was dismissed from CMA.4  Dr. 
Greenberg averred that he was unaware that Weil believed anything unethical was 
occurring at CMA before he was dismissed from the rotation.  “It is only intuitive that for 
protected conduct to be a substantial or motiv[at]ing factor in a decision, the 
decisionmakers must be aware of the protected conduct.”  Ambrose v. Township of 
Robinson, Pennsylvania, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002).  Weil does not claim that he 
raised his concerns with Dr. Greenberg.  Instead, Weil argues that he was dismissed 
because he told Leffert about his general concerns5 and speculates that Dr. Greenberg 
                                                                                                                                                 
Process Requirements, or LHU’s student code of conduct.  We agree. 
4 It is undisputed that McGraw made the decision to dismiss Weil from CMA, which Dr. 
Greenberg supported.  We focus our discussion on Dr. Greenberg as McGraw was not 
named as a defendant.   
5 In his deposition, Weil alleged that he met with Leffert to “discuss the [CMA] rotation 
in general” and “how things were going academically.”  Weil testified that he told 
Leffert, “I have some concerns about my current rotation,” but he did not “get into 
specifics” because he “want[ed] to make sure that what [he thought was] going on [was] 
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must have learned of this discussion before dismissing Weil.  However, Weil points to no 
evidence refuting Dr. Greenberg’s averment that he had “no knowledge” of Weil’s 
speech.  Without this evidence, Weil cannot survive summary judgment on his retaliation 
claim based on his dismissal from CMA.6  See id.      
II.  Preparing Weil’s Second Behavior Contract 
 The faculty defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Weil’s 
retaliation claim regarding his behavior contract.  Weil has not pointed to evidence that 
his protected speech was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the faculty’s decision to 
create a behavior contract. 7   See Ambrose, 303 F.3d at 493.  Eisenhauer, who 
spearheaded the formulation of Weil’s behavior contract, averred that he prepared the 
contract to “address Weil’s behavior” during his CMA rotation.  In an attempt to survive 
summary judgment, Weil pointed to two pieces of evidence he alleged revealed a 
retaliatory motive:  (1) in a draft-contract circulated among the faculty, one member 
commented that the faculty “[m]ay want to avoid suggesting that we anticipated him to 
not complete the program?”; and (2) in an email between two other faculty members, one 
                                                                                                                                                 
really going on.”  
6 The District Court determined that Dr. Greenberg was not a state actor as to his decision 
to dismiss Weil from CMA.  We need not address that conclusion because Dr. Greenberg 
was entitled to summary judgment for the reasons discussed herein.   
7 A behavior contract is a written document that informs an LHU student of their 
particular conduct that violates the school’s policies or procedures.  Weil was presented 
with a first behavior contract in April of 2009, before he began his clinical rotations.  
That behavior contract detailed the faculty’s concerns with Weil’s conduct, specifying 
that Weil had been late to class, was absent without permission, demonstrated a lack of 
sensitivity toward his peers, and behaved unprofessionally by confronting faculty 
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wrote: “Spoke about these issues with students yesterday have (sic) some ideas to share 
to maybe get them out earlier if they don’t play nice in the sandbox.”  However, no 
reasonable juror could conclude that this evidence alone would be sufficient to establish a 
retaliatory motive.  As to the first, the comment was directed to a section in the contract 
describing Weil’s behavior that resulted in his first behavioral contract, see supra n.7—
Weil signed that contract before he ever began his preceptorship about CMA.  Thus, any 
concern about Weil’s ability to complete the program predated his protected speech.  As 
to the second faculty comment, there is no real suggestion in it that the faculty intended 
to punish Weil for reporting his ethical concerns at CMA.  If anything, the comment is 
consistent with the defendants’ evidence that they created the contract to address 
longstanding and continuing concerns about Weil’s professionalism and competence.  As 
the District Court described on page 30 of its memorandum opinion, “the record makes 
clear that the PA Program faculty evaluated Weil’s poor performance at CMA based on 
many of the incidents and complaints McGraw experienced, and any discussion and 
dissent among the faculty was over how to interpret Weil’s clinical failings and what 
weight to ascribe each incident.”  Because Weil has pointed to no evidence to the 
contrary, he cannot survive summary judgment on that claim.    
III.  Subsequent Actions by LHU Faculty 
Summary judgment was also proper as to Weil’s claims that the LHU faculty took 
multiple actions—in addressing his grade appeals, requiring him to re-take practical 
                                                                                                                                                 
members.     
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examinations before continuing the program, proctoring and grading those examinations, 
and ultimately dismissing him from the program—to retaliate against him for reporting 
allegedly unethical conduct at CMA.  Weil has offered no direct evidence tending to 
show that his reporting was a substantial or motivating factor in any of these actions.  See 
Ambrose, 303 F.3d at 493.  Instead, to establish causation, Weil relies on precedent 
holding that causation can be inferred from “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a 
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”  Lauren, 480 F.3d 
at 267.  But even if we were to assume, doubtfully, that the timing was sufficient to 
establish causation, summary judgment was nevertheless proper.8  The record makes 
plain that the defendants’ actions were taken to address the consequences of a student’s 
failure to successfully complete his preceptorship—and to rehabilitate that student’s 
candidacy for a degree.  See id. (“A defendant may defeat the claim of retaliation by 
showing that it would have taken the same action eve if the plaintiff had not engaged in 
the protected activity.”).  The District Court’s thorough memorandum opinion addresses 
each of the defendants’ actions, and what the unrebutted evidence shows were the 
permissible motives underlying them.9  Here, we need only highlight instances in the 
                                              
8 The District Court concluded that Weil failed to point to direct evidence suggesting 
causation, and we have similar doubts.  Notably, Weil offered no real evidence that the 
LHU faculty as a whole wished to punish him simply for stating that he had questions 
about a handful of billing decisions at their colleague’s private medical practice.   
9 The District Court’s memorandum addresses Weil’s arguments regarding his interim 
grade appeals on pages 34-35; the fairness of the physical examination on pages 35-40; 
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record making clear that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.  The 
summary-judgment evidence was that the faculty required Weil to pass a practical 
examination before continuing the program because he had been absent from the program 
for months after he was dismissed from CMA.  As the District Court noted, students who 
had been absent from the PA Program were often required to demonstrate competent 
examination skills before being allowed to return.  Indeed, Weil had been required to pass 
such an exam after he returned from a medical leave of absence (before he began his 
rotations).  Moreover, nothing in the record contradicts the defendants’ evidence that 
Weil’s tests were proctored and graded based on their merits.  Finally, Weil was denied 
re-entry into the program because he failed the required practical examination.   
We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that no further discussion of any of 
Weil’s remaining arguments is necessary.10 
 For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                                                                                                                                 
and Weil’s appeal of his dismissal from LHU on page 40.  
10 On appeal, Weil does not argue that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on his retaliation claims involving the faculty’s decisions to: (1) update his 
transcript to reflect his failing grade in the preceptorship course; (2) allow Dr. 
Greenberg’s employees to investigate Weil’s claims of unlawful billing; (3) ignore his 
requests for his education records; or (4) deny his premature request to graduate.  
Therefore, any argument Weil could have made with respect to those claims is deemed 
waived.  See e.g. Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t., 421 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2005). 
